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THE OTHER THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FREE AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE
CONSTITUTION THAT WASN’T
STEPHEN KANTROWITZ *
This essay considers the great legacy of the Civil War, and of
Abraham Lincoln: the end of chattel slavery as a constitutional
institution and the principle of colorblind national citizenship. We are
accustomed to telling this story in full knowledge of how it turned out by
1870, with the constitutional transformations achieved. But I want to
think instead about a different history, about the very different and
much less encouraging Constitution that confronted African Americans
in the years leading up to emancipation. Under the stewardship of a
Supreme Court made up of justices appointed by proslavery presidents,
with enforcement provisions reflecting proslavery demands, that
Constitution seemed both to deny them citizenship and to hold slavery
sacrosanct. And lest we think that the election of a Republican to the
presidency in 1860 marked a decisive shift, I want to suggest that this
appears so only in hindsight. From the perspective of most AfricanAmerican activists, the declension of the nation from the principles of
the Declaration of Independence continued well into the 1860s.
Lincoln’s words and deeds often seemed to embody, not challenge, that
declension.
The constitutional situation of African Americans in the late 1850s
and early 1860s approached the level of existential peril. The outlines
1
are familiar. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 gave real teeth to the
2
guarantees of Article IV of the Constitution; soon afterwards, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott in 1857 and, in particular, Chief
Justice Taney’s dictum that black people had never been (and could not
be) citizens—for the black man “had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect”—rewrote the history of black citizenship as
* Professor of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on
Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”).
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oxymoronic. 3 Yet when writing about Lincoln, the Civil War, or
Reconstruction, we generally move quickly over this part of the story in
order to highlight the magnitude of the revolution that followed. After
a nod to the racialist views of Lincoln and other Republicans, we note,
correctly enough, that they were considerably less hostile than their
opponents to the possibility of African Americans’ freedom and
participation in at least some spheres of American life. We turn, for
verification of this premise, to Frederick Douglass’s retrospectively
declaring Lincoln “emphatically, the black mans President: the first to
4
show any respect for Their Rights as men.” We leave the story
somewhere in the period of triumph in the half-decade after
Appomattox, as African Americans moved toward what the era
considered full political citizenship. Some of us go on to show how
egregiously those rights were abridged for generations after, but always
with the knowledge of the post-World War II black-freedom movement
and the final vindication of those postwar amendments.
Here, by contrast, I am interested in another question: how things
looked to the black activists who felt the storm coming in the 1850s but
could not know how or where it would leave them. From the
perspective of black activists—including but not limited to Frederick
Douglass—the situation looked rather different at least until the war
broke out, and, to many, for several years after that. From that
perspective, the future of the United States looked quite different, in
ways that caused even the staunchest friends of the American nation to
lose heart.
The Fugitive Slave Law and Dred Scott laid the groundwork for the
great fear of the 1850s, and it set black activists off in at least three
directions: into Republican politics, emigration, or slave revolt. That is,
in addition to political engagement, black activists also considered two
entirely different avenues of response: flight from the United States or
treason against it.
Many, like Douglass, considered all three possibilities—voting,
fleeing, and fighting. Douglass famously came to reject the Garrisonian
abolitionist view that the Constitution was a proslavery instrument, and

3. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406–07 (1857).
4. Frederick Douglass, Eulogy on Abraham Lincoln (June 1, 1865), digitized on
Frederick Douglass Papers, Manuscript Division, No. al0177 (Libr. of Cong.), available at
http://www.myloc.gov/Exhibitions/lincoln/vignettes/lincolnanddouglass/ExhibitObjects/Freder
ickDouglassDescribingLincoln.aspx.
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the consequent withdrawal from party politics under its terms. 5 He
believed instead, as did most of his comrades across the black North,
that the Constitution in various ways affirmed both the illegality of
slavery and the power of the federal government to abolish it by
legislation. He became a Liberty man, then a member of the Radical
6
Abolitionist party. At the same time, he believed that slaves had a right
of revolution against a government that ignored their natural rights and
republican citizenship. Although Douglass was only a peripheral
member of John Brown’s conspiracy to overthrow slavery in 1859, he
7
fled the country one step ahead of an arrest warrant. He wrote home to
deny that he was or could be a “traitor” to the United States: the
government Douglass was accused of rebelling against was not his own,
for “[a]llegiance and protection are said to go together, and depend
upon each other. When one is withdrawn”—as Dred Scott had
8
withdrawn protection from Douglass and his peers—“the other ceases.”
The rejection of black citizenship appeared to be on the rise at the
state level as well. A succession of territorial legislatures, including
those under Republican governments, voted on constitutions that
9
formally excluded black residents. Even more dramatically, as the
1850s waned, movements to expel or reenslave free blacks gained
traction in a number of Southern state legislatures.
For most of the 1850s, black Northern activists kept the faith in one
crucial way: while insisting on their natural rights, including the right of
revolution to preserve those rights, most remained friends in principle of
the idea of the United States. They vigorously opposed a renewed
emigration movement, championed by Henry Highland Garnet, Martin
Delany, and others, which imagined different avenues to citizenship and
10
belonging, in Africa, Hayti (as it was then called), or Canada. Instead,
black activists such as Newport, Rhode Island’s George Downing
refigured their moment of trial as something transcendent—as an
expression, in fact, of the founding principles of the nation. The United
5. See DAVID W. BLIGHT, FREDERICK DOUGLASS’ CIVIL WAR: KEEPING FAITH IN
JUBILEE 30–35 (1989).
6. See id. at 35, 50–51.
7. BRIAN MCGINTY, JOHN BROWN’S TRIAL 328 (2009).
8. Frederick Douglass, To My American Readers and Friends, 2 DOUGLASS’ MONTHLY
(Rochester, N.Y.) 162 (1859).
9. See RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1837–1860, at 97–98, 173–74, 323 (1976).
10. See MARTIN R. DELANY: A DOCUMENTARY READER 1–22 (Robert S. Levine ed.,
2003); STERLING STUCKEY, SLAVE CULTURE: NATIONALIST THEORY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF BLACK AMERICA 138–92 (1987).
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States, Downing said in 1859, was divinely destined to “work out in
perfection the realization of a great principle, the fraternal unity of
11
man.” African Americans were essential to that process, for their
presence, as oppressed slaves or nominally free, forced the question of
how deeply Americans were committed to their founding ideals. As the
country at last reckoned with that great contradiction, “[a]ll of the great
principles of the land are brought out and discussed in connection with
12
the Negro.” Downing therefore urged his compatriots not to consider
emigration, for if they departed, “[t]he great ethical school of the times,
13
In the war over the
would be closed for the want of a subject.”
meaning of American liberty, equality, and republicanism, he explained,
14
“We are the alphabet; upon us, all are constructed.”
But the events of the secession winter, and in particular the
congressional moves to appease Southern slaveholders, challenged even
this provisional, processual patriotism. After Lincoln’s election, the
outgoing president, James Buchanan, told Congress that unless
Northern states repealed their Personal Liberty Laws, Southern states
“would be justified in revolutionary resistance to the Government of the
15
Meanwhile, numerous compromise proposals circulated
Union.”
through Congress. Two of them bear close attention. The Crittenden
Compromise imagined the permanent reestablishment of the Missouri
16
Compromise line, with slavery inviolable below that line. But despite
the continuing drama surrounding its proposals, it was not the
Crittenden proposals that passed Congress. Instead, a proposed
Thirteenth Amendment, the Corwin Amendment, would have
prohibited any amendment to the Constitution giving Congress the
17
power to interfere with or abolish slavery where it was currently lawful.
On the eve of Lincoln’s inauguration, the Corwin Amendment passed
both houses of Congress by the requisite two-thirds majority and was
18
sent on to the states for ratification. Maryland and Ohio even ratified
11. George T. Downing, President, New England Colored Citizens Convention, Address
Before the New England Colored Citizens Convention (Aug. 1, 1859), in 29 LIBERATOR
(Boston) 132 (1859).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE
NORTH 1780–1861, at 202 (1974) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 2
(1861)).
16. See The Crittenden Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1861, at 4.
17. See 12 Stat. 251.
18. See id.; CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1285, 1403 (1861) (reflecting votes).
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it in conventions. 19 In his inaugural address, the new president referred
to the Corwin Amendment as nothing new or objectionable, merely an
20
explicit statement of what he called “implied constitutional law.”
As bad as this was for proponents of an antislavery Constitution, it
could have been worse, and very nearly was. The Corwin Amendment
was offered in part because the Crittenden proposals displeased
proslavery Democrats, who rejected any limit on the spread of slavery.
To make the Crittenden proposals more palatable to this constituency
and bring them forward as a constitutional settlement of the slavery
question, Stephen Douglas crafted stringently and explicitly anti-black
21
supplementary articles which were introduced in both houses. The
first of these struck fear in the hearts of men such as Frederick Douglass
and George Downing. It declared: “The elective franchise and the right
to hold office, whether federal, State, territorial, or municipal, shall not
be exercised by persons who are, in whole or in part, of the African
22
race.” This rendered explicit that the United States was to be a white
man’s polity, dashing the hopes of most free blacks and doing a positive
constitutional injury to those in Massachusetts and elsewhere who voted
and even aspired to political office. The second of the Illinois senator’s
articles was even more ominous:
The United States shall have power to acquire from time
to time districts of country in Africa and South America,
for the colonization, at expense of the federal treasury, of
such free negroes and mulattoes as the several States
may wish to have removed from their limits, and from
the District of Columbia, and such other places as may
23
be under the jurisdiction of Congress.
Consider again the specifics: colonization “of such free negroes and
mulattoes as the several States may wish to have removed.” Colonization
here dropped its paternalist mask of gradualist civilizationism and made
its true desire explicit: the involuntary deportation of free African
Americans. When presented in the House as a substitute measure for
the Corwin Amendment, the Crittenden Compromise plus these

19. 1862 Md. Laws 22; 1861 Ohio Laws 190.
20. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 270 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953).
21. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1861).
22. 36 J. OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S., 1860–61, at 217–18 (1860)
[hereinafter HOUSE JOURNAL].
23. Id.
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proposals failed, but only by a margin of 80–113—and this after many
slave-state representatives had already resigned to join the
24
Confederacy.
For people who imagined themselves as political citizens of a
perfected United States, these were existential threats. And they raised
the question anew for African Americans: was the United States a good
idea? By the early months of 1861, fewer and fewer were able to answer
the question decisively in the affirmative. Black Northerners began to
lose heart. George Downing no longer sounded the defiantly optimistic
tones of 1859, when he proudly identified black Americans with the
nation’s divine project. Now, in An Appeal to the White Citizens of the
State, he pleaded with his countrymen not to abandon that common
destiny: “Drive us not to an inhospitable land, either soon to die of
fever or deteriorate in intellect, under the influence of a superstitious
25
But he spoke now from fear and despair more than
religion.”
conviction. Downing’s editor presented him as having “no doubt that
the North would sacrifice the whole race of colored people to save the
26
Union.”
No wonder, then, that as the spring began, even the most strident of
the anti-emigrationists despaired. If the North were indeed ready to
“sacrifice the whole race of colored people,” then, Frederick Douglass
concluded, it might be time to consider other alternatives. Douglass’s
rhetoric took a new turn. “If we go any where, let us go to Hayti,” he
wrote in January 1861, and that conditional “if” quickly moved toward
27
personal interest. Within a few months, Douglass announced on the
front page of his newspaper that he was about to depart for a tour of the
black republic, in part to investigate the island as a possible home. He
acknowledged what many of his readers across the North were thinking:
During the last few years the minds of the free colored
people in all the States have been deeply exercised in
relation to what may be their future in the United
States. . . . At the North there are, alas! too many proofs
24. See R. Alton Lee, The Corwin Amendment in the Secession Crisis, 70 OHIO HIST. Q.
1 (1961); HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 22, at 407–13 (recording the House’s Feb. 27, 1861
vote on the Crittenden proposals); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1260–61 (1861)
(same).
25. George T. Downing, An Appeal to the White Citizens of the State, in Protest of
Colored Citizens, 31 LIBERATOR (Boston) 31 (1861).
26. Id.
27. Frederick Douglass, Emigration to Hayti, 3 DOUGLASS’ MONTHLY (Rochester,
N.Y.) 386 (1861).
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that the margin of life and liberty is becoming more
narrow every year. . . . The apprehension is general, that
proscription, persecution and hardships are to wax more
and more rigorous and more grievous with every year;
and for this reason they are now, as never before, looking
out into the world for a place of retreat, an asylum from
the apprehended storm which is about to beat pitilessly
28
upon them.
Pleas, remonstrances, elections, and revolts—all had failed to turn the
hearts of white Americans. Perhaps, finally, the time had come to look
elsewhere.
While the outbreak of war changed Douglass’s calculation, it did not
immediately change prevailing Union views of black citizenship.
President Lincoln, as we have seen, argued that the Constitution under
which he was going to war countenanced the inviolability of slavery
29
General Benjamin Butler arrived in Maryland,
where it existed.
promising to defend the state’s citizens in the event of a possible slave
30
revolt, as implied by the Constitution. And Abraham Lincoln greeted
a delegation of black leaders in 1862 with urgings to lead their people
out of the country: “Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is
31
32
still upon you.” Of this fact he said, “I cannot alter it if I would.”
We know the end of this story: how slaves and free blacks forced
themselves upon an unwilling Union, made themselves essential to
military victory, and created the legacy of military service that prompted
Lincoln, then Congress, then the states to imagine them as free, as
citizens, and even as voters. In concluding our account of the Civil War
era with that story, we have naturalized the arc of events into an
inevitable triumph of right over wrong, one that, in constitutional terms,
would survive the end of Reconstruction and the imposition of Jim
Crow. Yet, in losing sight of how close the nation came to a
constitutional order guaranteeing the survival of slavery, we lose sight of
how tenuous the nation’s claim on African-American patriotism had
become, and of how hard it was for black activists to reconcile
28. Frederick Douglass, A Trip to Hayti, 3 DOUGLASS’ MONTHLY (Rochester, N.Y.)
449–50 (1861).
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
30. HOWARD P. NASH, STORMY PETREL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF GENERAL
BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, 1818–1893, at 89 (1969); cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
31. Refuge of Oppression: The President on African Colonization, 32 LIBERATOR
(Boston) 133 (1862).
32. Id.
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themselves to the Union. Frederick Douglass now stands in as the
representative African-American founder of the nation and the moral
counterweight to Lincoln’s political genius, but it is all too easy to forget
how close even he came to rethinking his allegiances, let alone how
many of his compatriots wavered or even departed in the last bitter
years before emancipation and Reconstruction.
Free African
Americans’ dogged, persistent hope that the United States was, for
them, a good idea, turned out to be essential: essential to Union victory,
to the establishment of nonracial citizenship, to the remaking of the
Constitution. We forget at our peril that that very hope was, across all
of our national history, perhaps the single greatest collective leap of
faith.

